

Privacy-optimal strategies for smart metering systems with a rechargeable battery

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American Control Conference
6 July, 2016



Smart Meters empower smart grids
Fine grained consumption measurements
are needed for:

- ▶ Time-of-use pricing
- ▶ Demand response
- ▶ ...





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Comprehensive report: How smart meters invade privacy

August 29, 2014 by K. T. Weaver

big data, democracy, Fourth Amendment, privacy, rights, smart meters, spying

6 Comments

by K.T. Weaver, for Take Back Your Power

Last week, SkyVision Solutions released an updated report entitled, "A Perspective on How Smart Meters Invade Individual Privacy."





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Doctor, Bully, Futurist, Spy: The 'Smart Meter'

By MATTHEW L. WALD MAY 20, 2010 2:00 PM



Will future energy and health researchers get useful data from "smart meters"?

As utilities around the country install meters that can





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Smart Meters: Between Economic Benefits And Privacy Concerns



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**Comprehensive report: How smart meters
invade privacy**

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Smart meters The Observer

Energy smart meters are a threat to privacy, says watchdog

European Data Protection Supervisor warns 'massive collection of personal data' could
be accessed without safeguards


**Smart Meters: Between Economic
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
Smart-meter privacy-


What is the minimum **information leakage rate** if consumers obfuscate consumption using a rechargeable battery?

What are **privacy-optimal** battery charging strategies?










Energy conservation

$$S_{t+1} = S_t + Y_t - X_t, \quad S_t \in \mathcal{S} \text{ (Size of battery)}$$




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Objective

Choose battery charging strategy $q = \{q_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ to

$$\min \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} I^q(X^T; Y^T) \quad \text{(mutual information rate)}$$

Why is the problem non-trivial?

$\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{S} = \{0, 1\}$, $P_X = [0.5, 0.5]$ (Binary model)

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Consider performance of **memoryless policies**

Deterministic Memoryless Policy

▷ $P(Y|X = 0, S = 0) = [1 \ 0]$; $P(Y|X = 1, S = 1) = [0 \ 1]$: Leakage = 1 ($\because Y_t = X_t$).

▷ $P(Y|X = 0, S = 0) = [0 \ 1]$; $P(Y|X = 1, S = 1) = [1 \ 0]$: Leakage ≈ 1 ($\because Y_t = 1 - S_t$).

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Randomized Memoryless Policy

- ▶ $P(Y|X = 0, S = 0) = [0.5 \ 0.5]$; $P(Y|X = 1, S = 1) = [0.5 \ 0.5]$: Leakage = 0.5.
- ▶ Is this the **best** memoryless policy?
- ▶ Is this the **optimal** policy?
- ▶ How do we **evaluate** the performance of an arbitrary policy? Need $\mathbb{P}(X^T, Y^T)$?

Literature overview

Evaluate privacy of specific battery management policies

- ▶ [Kalogridis et al., 2010] Monte-Carlo evaluation of best-effort policy
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Dynamic programming decomposition to identify optimal policies

- ▶ [Yao Venkitasubramanian, 2013] Dynamic program and computable inner and upper bounds on privacy.

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Many results restrict to the binary battery model

Main results: Markovian demand

Structure of optimal strategies

Define **belief state** $\pi_t(x, s) = \mathbb{P}(X_t = x, S_t = s | Y^{t-1})$

Charging strategies of the form $q_t(y_t | x_t, s_t, \pi_t)$ are optimal.

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Dynamic programming decomposition

Let \mathcal{A} denote the class of conditional distributions on \mathcal{Y} given (X, S) .

Suppose there exists a $J \in \mathbb{R}$ and $v: \mathcal{P}_{X,S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies the following:

$$J^* + v(\pi) = \inf_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ I(\mathbf{a}; \pi) + \sum_{x,s,y} \pi(x, s) \mathbf{a}(y|x, s) v(\varphi(\pi, y, \mathbf{a})) \right\}$$

Then,

▶ J^* is the minimum leakage rate

▶ Let $f^*(\pi)$ denote the arg min of the RHS and $\mathbf{a}^* = f^*(\pi)$.

Then, J^* is achieved by the charging policy

$$q^*(y | x_t, s_t, \pi_t) = \mathbf{a}^*(y | x_t, s_t) \quad (\text{note } \mathbf{a}^* \text{ depends on } \pi_t)$$

Main results: Markovian demand

Structure of optimal strategies

- ▶ Similar to DP for POMDP.
- ▶ Per-step cost is concave rather than linear.
- ▶ However, $v(\pi)$ is still concave.

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Main results: i.i.d. demand

Solution of the dynamic program

$$J^* := \min_{\theta \in \mathcal{P}_S} I(S - X; X)$$

where $X \sim P_X$ and $S \sim \theta$. Let θ^* denote the arg min of the RHS.

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Optimal strategies

$$\text{Define } b^*(y|w) = \begin{cases} \frac{P_X(y)\theta^*(y+w)}{\sum_{(x,s):x-s=w} P_X(x)\theta^*(s)}, & \text{if } y \in \mathcal{X} \text{ and } y+w \in \mathcal{S} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then, J^* is achieved by time-invariant action

$$q_t^*(y|x_t, s_t, \pi_t) = b^*(y|s_t - x_t) \quad (\text{note } b^* \text{ does not depend on } \pi_t)$$

Salient features of the solution

$I(S - X; X)$ is concave in \mathcal{P}_S

J^* and θ^* may be computed using Blahut–Arimoto algorithm.

Optimal policy is stationary and memoryless

$$q_t^*(y|x^t, s^t) = b^*(y|s_t - x_t) \quad (\text{note } b^* \text{ does not depend on } \pi_t)$$

If $S_t \sim \theta^*$, then $S_{t+1} \sim \theta^*$ and $S_{t+1} \perp Y^t$.

Support of consumptions

Even if $\mathcal{Y} \supset \mathcal{X}$, under the optimal policy the support of P_Y is \mathcal{X} .

Structure of the solution

If P_X is symmetric (and unimodal), so is θ^* .

For binary model, $\theta^* = [0.5 \ 0.5]$ is optimal!

Example

$$P_X \sim \text{Bin}(n, 0.5)$$

Corresponds to the situation when there are n devices where each device is ON or OFF with equal probability.

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
Corresponds to the situation when there are n devices where each device is ON or OFF with equal probability.

For $n = 6$, and $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{S} = \{0, \dots, 6\}$, we get

$$J^* = 0.1638$$


$$\theta^* = \{0.0586, 0.1332, 0.1972, 0.2220, 0.1972, 0.1332, 0.0586\}$$

Example




evice

Example



vice

Example



vice

Proof outlines

Proof outline for Markovian demand

Conceptual
difficulty

Let \mathcal{Q}_A denote all admissible policies. For any policy $\mathbf{q} \in \mathcal{Q}_A$,

$$I^{\mathbf{q}}(S_1, X^T; Y^T) = \sum_{t=1}^T I^{\mathbf{q}}(S_1, X^t; Y_t | Y^{t-1})$$

The cost is additive, but per-step cost depends on $\mathbb{P}(S_1, X^t, Y_t | Y^{t-1})$.

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Lemma

Let $\mathcal{Q}_B \subset \mathcal{Q}_A$ denote randomized charging policies of the form $q(y_t | x^t, s^t, y^{t-1}) = q(y_t | x_t, s_t, y^{t-1})$. Then,

1. For any policy $\mathbf{q}_a \in \mathcal{Q}_A$, there exists a policy $\mathbf{q}_b \in \mathcal{Q}_B$ such that

$$I^{\mathbf{q}_a}(S_1, X^T; Y^T) \geq I^{\mathbf{q}_b}(S_1, X^T; Y^T)$$

Thus, we may restrict attention to charging policies in \mathcal{Q}_B .

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Thus, for policies in \mathcal{Q}_B , the cost is additive and the per-step cost depends on $\mathbb{P}(S_t, \mathbf{X}_t, Y_t | \mathbf{Y}^{t-1})$.

Proof outline for Markovian demand (cont.)

Equivalent controlled Markov process

[Inspired by Tatikonda Mitter 2009, Capacity of channels with feedback]

State Space : $\mathcal{P}_{X,S}$

Action Space: $\{a \in \mathcal{P}_{Y|X,S}$ such that energy conservation is satisfied. $\}$

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Dynamics : $\pi_{t+1} = \varphi(\pi_t, y_t, \mathbf{a}_t)$ where φ is a non-linear filter.

Per-step cost: $I^q(X_t, S_t; Y_t | y^{t-1}) = I(\mathbf{a}_t; \pi_t)$, where

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The above structure implies the dynamic programming decomposition

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Proof outline for i.i.d. demand

Simplifying state space

Let $W_t = S_t - W_t$ and $\xi_t(w) = \mathbb{P}(W_t = w | Y^{t-1} = y^{t-1})$. Then,

1. $\xi_t(w) = \sum_{(x,s): s-x=w} \pi_t(x, s)$.
2. $\pi_t(x, s) = P_X(x)\theta(s)$, where $\theta = P_X * \xi$.

Thus, ξ_t is equivalent to π_t

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Simplifying action space

Let $\mathcal{B} = \{b \in \mathcal{P}_{Y|W} \text{ s.t. energy convs. is satisfied}\}$. For $a \in \mathcal{A}$ and $\pi \in \mathcal{P}_{X,S}$

$$\text{Define } b(y|w) = \frac{\sum_{(\tilde{x}, \tilde{s}): \tilde{s}-\tilde{x}=w} a(y|\tilde{x}, \tilde{s})\pi(\tilde{x}, \tilde{s})}{\sum_{(\tilde{x}, \tilde{s}): \tilde{s}-\tilde{x}=w} \pi(\tilde{x}, \tilde{s})}, \quad \tilde{a}(y|x, s) = b(y|s-x).$$

- Then,
1. **Invariant transitions:** $\varphi(\pi, y, a) = \varphi(\pi, y, \tilde{a})$.
 2. **Lower cost:** $I(a; \pi) \geq I(\tilde{a}; \pi) = I(b; \xi)$.

Thus, we may restrict attention to \mathcal{B} .

Proof outline for i.i.d. demand

Simplified DP:

$$J^* + v(\xi) = \inf_{\mathbf{b} \in \mathcal{B}} \left\{ I(\mathbf{b}; \xi) + \sum_{w, \mathbf{y}} \xi(w) \mathbf{b}(\mathbf{y}|w) v(\tilde{\varphi}(\xi, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b})) \right\}$$

Simplifying action space

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1. **Invariant transitions:** $\varphi(\pi, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{a}) = \varphi(\pi, \mathbf{y}, \tilde{\mathbf{a}})$.
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Proof outline for i.i.d. demand

Simplified DP:

$$J^* + v(\xi) = \inf_{\mathbf{b} \in \mathcal{B}} \left\{ I(\mathbf{b}; \xi) + \sum_{w, y} \xi(w) \mathbf{b}(y|w) v(\tilde{\varphi}(\xi, y, \mathbf{b})) \right\}$$


Simplifying action space

We show that $J^* = \min_{\theta \in \mathcal{P}_S} I(S - X; X)$ and \mathbf{b}^* given in the Theorem satisfy the above DP.

- Then,
1. **invariant transitions:** $\varphi(\pi, y, \mathbf{a}) = \varphi(\pi, y, \mathbf{a})$.
 2. **Lower cost:** $I(\mathbf{a}; \pi) \geq I(\tilde{\mathbf{a}}; \pi) = I(\mathbf{b}; \xi)$.

Thus, we may restrict attention to \mathcal{B} .

Summary



Energy conservation $S_{t+1} = S_t + Y_t - X_t$, $S_t \in \mathcal{S}$ (Size of battery)

Randomized charging strategy $q_t(y_t|x^t, s^t, y^{t-1})$: Probability that the consumption $Y_t = y_t$ given history of demand, battery charge, and consumption,

Objective Choose battery charging strategy $q = \{q_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ to

$$\min \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} I^q(X^T; Y^T) \quad (\text{mutual information rate})$$

Summary

Main results: Markovian demand

Structure of optimal strategies

- ▶ Similar to DP for POMDP.
- ▶ Per-step cost is concave rather than linear.
- ▶ However, $v(\pi)$ is still concave.

Dynamic programming decomposition

Let \mathcal{A} denote the class of conditional distributions on \mathcal{Y} given $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{S})$.

Suppose there exists a $J \in \mathbb{R}$ and $v: \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{S}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies the following:

$$J^* + v(\pi) = \inf_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ I(\mathbf{a}; \pi) + \sum_{x, s, y} \pi(x, s) \mathbf{a}(y|x, s) v(\varphi(\pi, y, \mathbf{a})) \right\}$$

Then,

- ▶ J^* is the minimum leakage rate
- ▶ Let $f^*(\pi)$ denote the arg min of the RHS and $\mathbf{a}^* = f^*(\pi)$.

Then, J^* is achieved by the charging policy

$$q^*(y|x_t, s_t, \pi_t) = \mathbf{a}^*(y|x_t, s_t) \quad (\text{note } \mathbf{a}^* \text{ depends on } \pi_t)$$

Summary

Main results: Markovian demand

Main results: i.i.d. demand

Solution of the dynamic program

$$J^* := \min_{\theta \in \mathcal{P}_S} I(S - X; X)$$

where $X \sim P_X$ and $S \sim \theta$. Let θ^* denote the arg min of the RHS.

Then, J^* is the minimum leakage rate

Optimal strategies

$$\text{Define } b^*(y|w) = \begin{cases} \frac{P_X(y)\theta^*(y+w)}{\sum_{(x,s):x-s=w} P_X(x)\theta^*(s)}, & \text{if } y \in \mathcal{X} \text{ and } y+w \in \mathcal{S} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then, J^* is achieved by time-invariant action

$$q_t^*(y|x_t, s_t, \pi_t) = b^*(y|s_t - x_t) \quad (\text{note } b^* \text{ does not depend on } \pi_t)$$




Summary

Main results: Markovian demand

Main results: iid demand

Example



vice

Smart-meter privacy-(Li, Mahajan and Khisti)



Conclusion

Dynamic programming characterization of optimal privacy in smart meters

Identify structure of optimal strategies

For i.i.d. demand, identify optimal charging strategies and a **single letter** characterization of optimal leakage rate.

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Remark on modeling assumptions

The results generalize to higher order Markov demands

The results generalize to continuous state spaces

The results are applicable if the demand is modeled as a deterministic process + noise, where the noise is Markov or i.i.d.

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Future directions

Optimal leakage rate in the presence of local energy harvesting devices?